COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
vs.
JOHN PETER SKANDIER,
Defendant,
OPINION
This opinion is issued pursuant to Rule 1925 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. We refer to this Court's findings of fact issued January 18, 1994 in this case and incorporate same in this memorandum.
On January 20, 1994, Defendant was convicted of Criminal Conspiracy to Unlawfully Possess Drug Paraphernalia. Defendant filed a post-sentence motion to arrest judgment on the grounds the evidence was insufficient to support conviction. We now consider the facts and law relevant to this case.
On February 4, 1993, Trooper Terrance Whalen of the Pennsylvania State Police stopped a vehicle for speeding on Route 79 in Deer Creek Township. The vehicle was being driven by Jo Elaine Davis. Michael St.Onge was seated in the front passenger seat. The Defendant was seated in the rear seat.
When asked for her license and vehicle registration, Davis handed Trooper Whalen her license and a rental agreement. The rental agreement listed Defendant as the named lessee. When asked where the Defendant was, Davis told the trooper that he was home in Meadville. When asked, the Defendant gave his name as Timothy Miller. Davis denied that Defendant was in the back seat.
Trooper Whalen conducted a consensual search of the vehicle and found a marijuana cigarette and an inhaler under the front passenger seat. He found a set of scales and a scoop in the rear seat inside a pillow case. The Erie Crime Lab tested the scoop and scales. Both contained cocaine residue.
Defendant was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia while being acquitted of possess of drug paraphernalia. A person may be convicted of conspiracy and acquitted of the substantive offense. Commonwealth v. Love, 248 Pa. Super. 387, 375 A.2d 151 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rosen, 141 Pa.Super. 272, 14 A.2d 833 (1940). In other words, Defendant may be convicted of conspiracy to Unlawfully Possess Drug Paraphernalia while being acquitted of actually possessing the drug paraphernalia.
So, the Court must determine if there is sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant on the crime of conspiracy. In reviewing questions of sufficiency of the evidence, a court must accept as true all the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which the fact-finder could have based its verdict and then ask whether that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Stockard, 489 Pa. 209, 413 A.2d 1088 (1980).
There is no direct evidence of the conspiracy. This is not unusual. The unlawful agreement, which is at the heart of every conspiracy and the nexus which will invoke principles of vicarious liability, will rarely be proved by direct evidence of a formal agreement with precise terms. The very nature of the crime of conspiracy makes it susceptible to proof usually by circumstantial evidence. Therefore, courts have traditionally looked to the relation, conduct, and circumstances of the parties and the overt acts of the co-conspirator in order to find a corrupt confederation. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 307 Pa. Super. 102, 106-108, 452 A.2d 1058, 1060-1061 (1982). Guilt may be proved all or in part by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Axe, 285 Pa. Super 289, 427 A.2d 227 (1981).
Although presence at the scene of the crime and participation in the object of the conspiracy are not sufficient independently to prove confederation, they may be sufficient to furnish a web of evidence linking the accused to the conspiracy when they are in conjunction with each other and considering the context of the situation. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 354 Pa.Super 555, 512 A.2d 679, appeal denied 514 Pa. 629, 522 A.2d 558 (1986). Also, subsequent acts may prove a conspiracy if those acts support an inference of prior agreement. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 355 Pa.Super. 19, 483 A.2d 933 (1984); Commonwealth v. Rosen, 141 Pa.Super. 272, 14 A.2d 833 (1940).
Defendant and Davis were in the car during the stop and search by Trooper Whalen. The car was rented in Defendant's name. Davis was the driver of the car. Prior to Defendant giving a false name when questioned by police, Davis lied to police about the whereabouts of the Defendant. After Defendant gave a false name, Davis lied to police a second time saying that Defendant was at home when asked if the Defendant was in the back seat.
The drug paraphernalia was found in close proximity to Defendant. The scales, scoop and a cover for a scale were in a pillow case which also contained a pillow. The pillow case was on the floor behind the driver's seat in plain view. The scales and scoop found in the rear seat contained cocaine residue.
The circumstances surrounding the stop and search of the car and the actions of Defendant and Davis provide sufficient circumstantial evidence by which an unlawful agreement may be proven. In addition to the unlawful agreement, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant or someone else party to the unlawful agreement did an overt act to further or facilitate the commission of the criminal act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. section 903. The Commonwealth names acquisition of the scales as the overt act needed to prove the charge of conspiracy.
We find sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of Conspiracy to Unlawfully Possess Drug Paraphernalia.
Accordingly, Defendant's post-trial motion to arrest judgment is DENIED.
BY THE COURT
______________________J.
Michael J. Wherry, Judge
gwb
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MERCER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
vs.
NO. 314 Criminal 1993
JOHN PETER SKANDIER,
Defendant,
AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 1994, upon the reasoning contained in the Opinion of the Court filed this same day, it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that Defendant's post-trial Motion to Arrest Judgment of Sentence is DENIED.
BY THE COURT
______________________J.
Michael J. Wherry, Judge
gwb
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